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Dialogue or Drama? The Event of
Interpretation in Gadamer and Foucault 1
Pol Vandevelde

Gadamer and Foucault, who were both influenced by Heidegger in different ways,
took from him the notion of 'event' as what characterizes thinking: We think within
an event. They both apply this notion to speech and, linked to it, to interpretation.
Gadamer says that understanding or interpretation is an event (Geschehen) and
Foucault uses Heidegger's expression in Being and Time of a 'history of the present'
(Geschichte der Gegenwart) 2 to describe what he does, which he also calls a 'turning
into events' (evenementialisation) or 'eventifying'. Both Gadamer and Foucault want
to treat what they investigate as an event, analysing it in its singularity and, at the
same time, they recognize their own interpretation to be an event and a singularity,
For both, interpretation has to be mindful of its situation and of the status of the
interpreter. Let us start with two preliminary remarks about their connection to
Heidegger and to each other.
About their connection to Heidegger, Gadamer repeatedly acknowledged his
profound debt to Heid.egger in many essays,~ acknowledging, for example, that
'Heidegger's criticism of transcendental inquiry and his thin.king of "the turn" form
the basis of my treatment of the universal hermeneutic problem·.• In the case of
Foucault his acknowledgement is more muted, but no less explicit. 'Heidegger has
always been for me the essential philosopher . .. . All my philosophical development
has been determined by my reading of Heidegger . ... Nietzsche and Heidegger, this
wu a philosophical shock!'' Indeed, whoever has read Foucault from The Order of
Things (1970) to his last .lectures at the College de France on the hermen'eutics of
the subject (1982-4) can only marvel at how much Heidegger's influence must have
bttn at play in his views and at how few references are made to Heidegger. When he
txamines the genealogy of the subject in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, answering a
question from the audience, he says:
Let's say that there have not been that many people who in the last years - I will
say in the twentieth century - have posed the question of truth. Not that many
people have posed the question: What is involved in the case of the subject and
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truth? And: What is the relationship of the subject to truth? What is the subject of
truth, what is the subject who speaks the truth, etcetera? As far as I am concerned,
I see only two. I see only Heidegger and Lacan. Personally, myself, you must have
heard this. I have tried to reflect on all this from the side of Heidegger and starting
from Heidegger.•
Despite this common Heideggerean influence, Gadamer and Foucault did not
interact with each other. While Gadamer made some general references to Foucault,
Foucault did not return the favour. The index of his massive, more than 3,400 pages
long, Dits et ecrits does not even list Gadamer. The reason for the lack of interaction
may be due to the fact that they saw themselves on opposite sides when it comes
to philosophical investigation: Gadamer founded a 'philosophical hermeneutics'
while Foucault rejected and dismissed hermeneutics. When Gadamer put much of
the energy of his 'philosophical hermeneutics' in 'dialogue', Foucault's main focus
was on 'discourse' and, later on, 'practices: Yet despite their profound differences
they offered us two original approaches to language that have several commonalities
and share the same goal of avoiding the two extreme views that language is an
'expression' of some mental content or a 'dissemination' of any intent. In addition,
they view language in its use by speakers, in its performance, but a performance
that is not scripted as pragmatics theorizes it. While a performative act, such as 'f
promise', can be uttered by anybody and is submitted to the rules of a promise, the
performance Gadamer and Foucault present, independently of each other, is a living
one - a dialogue for Gadamer and a drama for Foucault. What they reintroduce
in the speech act Is, in a sense, the perlocutionary that the speech act theory had
not theorized. But they reintroduce it not as external to speech, as if it were a mere
effect on listeners, but precisely as what gives traction to speech and has a return
effect on speakers. For both Gadamer and Foucault, speaking means accepting a
position of vulnerability, of not knowing at the moment of speech what will happen .
Dialogue, Gadamer tells us, may take an abrupt .turn, putting the speaker on the
spot as someone who has to answer. For Foucault, speaking is a drama that requires
courage on the part of the speaker for being put on the stage of a representation, one
that consists in telling the truth. In both cases, dialogue and drama, the speaker is
transformed by speech.
Because their own interpretation Is also made through language - the interpretation
they perform and the works they wrote - and because the object of their investigation
is also of a linguistic form - documents or books - they apply their views on speech
as event to their own task as interpreters. Understanding (Gadamer) or analysis
(Foucault) is an event as well To say as they do that their own investigation is an event,
Geschehm or evbtmrerrt, is not just the view that an account 'takes place' at some time
and thus, in an obvious sense, 'happens: nor the view that there may be a 'performative'
aspect to thinking or speaking such that an 'act' ofinterpretation or speech 'happened'.
Rather, they both link the investigation and the object of investigation. The view they
both defend is a two-pronged approach. First, the ontological make-up of things is
permeated through and through by language (Gadamer) or is fonned discursively
(Foucault). Second, their own enterprise of description is also historically situated.
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Thus, their own discourse tries to account for the singularity of what they investigate
from the vantage point of the singularity that their disc.ourse represents.
This leads them to reject the common •sense approach, so entrenched in philosophy,
that the obje!=t of investigation is static, has an intrinsic self-identity independently of
any discursive framework in which this object becomes salient to human concerns.
They thus accept the view that there are multiple accounts - 'interpretations' for
Gadamer and 'discursive formations' for Foucault. However, against historicism or
relativism, they both claim that the 'what' that is interpreted or discursively formed
cannot be appealed to as an independent entity over against so-caJled multiple
accounts. Interpreters and investigators operate from their present and bring their
present with them when approaching their object of investigation. Rejecting both a
direct realist view - that we can recover what really happened and what was really
meant - and a reconstructive view - that we project our own questions and ideas
onto what we investigate - both Gadamer and Foucault recognize that the correlation
between the investigation and the object of investigation is in fact productive of history.
When we investigate what is no longer present, we make history. This new approach
has significant consequences for what we ca11 the truth by accounting for the place
of the concrete investigator in the discourse about truth . In the first part I examine
Gadamer's notion of dialogue in language and in the second pan what Foucault calls
the dramatic of speech.

Gadamer: DiaJogue in language
In the third part of Truth and Method Gadamer explores what he calls Sprachlichkeit 'the dimension of language' - which is the beating heart of interpretation. It is a
dimension and thus not a mediation, for example, between the mind and objects,
which would take the form of the expression of concepts. Rather, Sprach/ichkeit is
the soil out of which concepts arise. Gadamer's focus is on language in its exercise
or in its performance. He was struck by how the early Heidegger made use of the
medieval distinction between the actus signatus - what is conveyed and thus named
by the proposition - and the actus exercitus - the performance of the act or the act
in its exercise. Language is not just a tool, but it has an operation. What Gadamer
draws from thjs is that we cannot strictly separate the thinking from the speaking or
the conceptual dimension from the linguistic dimension . Sprachlichkeit !s thus not
'ltnguisticality', as it is often translated, but precisely a dimension that overcomes the
false opposition between concepts and words. Language operates, is in exercise, and
we are in it.
We a.re in the dimension of language, and the 'are' is not a location or a situation
but an ontological condition. Being 'in' language negatively means, first, that when
speaking we do not have mastery over language as if only choosing the expressions
for what we have already articulated in concepts. It also means, second, that it is not
language that speaks as if we were an echo chamber for another voice. Positively,
being 'in' language means, third, that wha.t is verbal is inchoately conceptual or is, as
Gadamer uses the expression, conceptual in its very exercise as verbal. Thus, language
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neither expresses what would already be thought at some nonverbal level nor directly
speaks through us.. using us as channels or vectors. As he explains,
To be sure, what comes into language is something different from the spoken word
itself. But the word is a word only because of what comes into language in it Its
own physical being exists onJy in order to disappear into what is said. Likewise,
that which comes into language is not something that is pregiven before language;
rather, the word gives it its own determinateness. 7
When Gadamer states that being is language, it is not what Karl-Otto Apel calls a
'linguicism'R - everything is language - nor a Derridean dissemination - 'the subject
is a function of language' 9 - but the recognition that it is only within an articulation
in words that something can gain saliency and enter the realm of what makes sense.
To Derrida's emphasis on the dissemination of signs - which Gadamer examines in a
masterful manner in his essay 'Hermeneutics on the Trail' 10 - and to Heidegger's stress
on the original speaking of language, Gadamer re-affirms, after Plato, the articulating
role of the dialogue.
The dialogue he considers is not to be understood according to a communicative
theory that already presupposes 'subjects' or ·communication partners: as if the origin
of sense were to be found in the mind (intuition, volition, judgement, etc.). Dialogue
is not primarily a speaking to and fro, but more fundamentally an exchange that leads
the partners in discussion to find their own status as speakers. It is a performance
with its effects on subjects: listeners, but also speakers. Dialogue thus has a historical
dimension, turning the subject away from the maker of sense and back towards a
historically situated speaker who is at the receiving end of a process that started before
the speaking.
There is indeed a dissemination and there is indeed a first speaking before our
actual personal speech, but the first initiative is neither by signs nor by language. The
first impetus in language a.s dialogue is the existential and historical situation of those
who speak, in which situation a dialogue partner has'the power to initiate a discussion
or redirect a debate. Gadamer attempts to keep the Sprachlichlceit or dimension of
language away from any reduction to a semiotic or metaphysical instance, and to locate
it in its activity or what he calls a 'play', within which, we, human beings, find our place always historically situated - and our voice - always responsible and accountable.
'Language ... has its real being onJy in the fact that the world is presented in it: 11 and
because we are in the world we are also 'involved' in language in ways that can never
be fully clarified. This is not due to a lack, but to the fact that both objects and subjects
change and are mutually transformed by their interactions.
To say, as in the passage above, that the world is presented in language has significant
consequences for how we understand both the object and the subject. On the side of
the object or 'reality: if thinking is this 'coming to understanding' with others in a
dialogue and if language is the vehicle for those interactions. reality cannot lie frozen in
the position of a referent of discourse. Because there is language and because language
is in operation, what we call reality is in fa.ct what is susceptible to be talked about or
it is what is negotiated in the dialogues, the interactions among people, and in the
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language used. Reality the.n is of the order of a transaction. It is what is negotiated by
being spoken of, by being prese.nted in discourse. Gadamer writes:
Somethil}g is placed in the center, as the Greeks said, which the partners lo the
dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with one
another. Hence reaching an agreement on the subject matter of a conversation
necessarily means that a common language must first be worked out in the
conversatio.n. This is not an external matter of simply adjusting our tools; nor is
it even right to say that the partners adapt themselves to one another but, rather,
in a successful conversation they both come under the influence of the truth of
the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community. To reach an
understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward
and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a
communion in which we do not remain what we were. 12
Against any simplistic idealism, this negotiated reality or this reality that is of the
nature of a transaction is not fixed, but always susceptible to be presented again. It is
thus not simply what is projected by speakers - as if it were a mere construction - but
rather what sustains the dialogue in the ambiguous sense of what nurtures it - what
Sartre called the ·coefficient of adversity' - and what underlies it. Reality is interpreted,
but it is not a fabrication. Dialogue determines the boundaries of the transaction as
well as the framework for the vocabulary used in the transaction and the parameters
agreed upon.
Things, Gadamer tells us, have a language: 'The language that things have - whatever
kind of things they may be - is not the logos ousias, and it is not fulfilled in the self
contemplation of an infinite intellect; it is the language that our finite, historical nature
apprehends when we learn to speak.' 13 Dialogue thus offers stability and change; as
transactions vary so does the reality that is transacted. There is thus no relati.vlsm of
scheme over content, as, for example, Davidson understands it. 1
With regard to the ·subject, this emphasis on the productive aspect of language
means that subjects are interpreters. We recall that 'understanding' is for Heidegger
in Being and Time one of the fundamental 'existentials' or ontological components
of human existence, besides 'situatedness' (Befindlichkeit) and discourse (Rede).
Because subjects are interpreters, they do not occupy a neutral position and cannot
take a sideways view on reality. They are themselves situated in history; they faU into
hutorical times within a language so that interpretation has to remain mindful of its
own 'performance'. Interpretation is thus less a matter of judgement and more a matter
of'responding'. As Gadamer succinctly puts it, understanding is an 'event'." It is not an
event in the sense of something that happens, but in the sense that history is part and
parcel of the interpretation. History has an 'articulating' function so that the object of
interpretation can neither be definitely 'past' and done with nor stripped of its historical
garment. Because understanding or interpretation is an event, things, facts, and people
are approached within the event with the result that any talk of an 'in Itself' that things
may have before being taun up by history can only be a matter for nostalgia - we can
never fully understand - or dogma - sciences tell us what reality is made of.
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To interpret from within the event thus means, oR the one hand, to pay attention
to the historical situation of what we investigate and, on the other, to be mindful of
our own historical position. We recognize here Gadamer's famous 'fusion of horizons'.
What allows history to have this articulating role is precisely language in the form
of dialogue. This is how language can be the engine of history or, as Gadamer says,
language is 'the experience of the world' ( Welterfahrung).' 6 This view of the object of
understanding being formed by understanding blurs the line between what is linguistic
and what is conceptual. We recall that Sprachlichkeitnames that dimension'oflanguage
that is also conceptual. Gadamer makes us sensitive again to the fact that concepts,
which we tend to take as rigid tools and free from genesis, actually have a birth place.
After Heidegger, but in a manner far more concrete and clear, Gadamer argues that
concepts originate in language as it is used. Concepts, Gadamer says, do not predate
language but are nurtured by language as used, grow out of it so that language neither
precedes thinking, as if it were another thinking 'before' the actual thinking, nor
merely expresses concepts. The 'humeneutic experience: as Gadamer characterizes
interpretation, is thus not 'an experience of thinking' (Erfahrung des Denkens) as an
exercise that tries to 'free itself entirely from the power of language'. 17 It is rather 'an
activity of the thing itself (ein Tun der Sache selbst], an action (Tun] that, unlike the
methodology of modern science, is a passion, an understanding, an event that happens
to one'. 18 We are transformed by our th inking.
This entanglement of language and thinking tries to avoid a sequential path from
the world to the mind through concepts. Instead of a linear movement it is rather a
spiral, as depicted in the famous 'hermeneutic circle'. We have to start where we are, but
the starting point is always modifiable, re-engulfed by the path trodden. It is precisely
the task of thinking to maintain the movement so that the positions of subjects and
objects do not become rigid but remain placeholders. What matters, as Gadamer says,
is to render 'passable again the path from the concept to the word so that thinking
speaks to us again: 19 As a dialogue, thinking is a living enterprise that must keep us
from confusing thinking with an argumentative game or solving puzzles. What keeps
thinking alive, relevant, grafted onto the world as it goes is the exchange between
language and concepts. As Gadamer recommends, 'We only should not think ...
as though philosophical concepts were available in some warehouse to be simply
hauled out from there .. . we should foUow the semantic life of language and this
means: go back to the point where the concept emerges out of speaking itself, out of the
"situatedness in life" [Sftz im Leben].'2° Concepts are fluid or, we could say, operative,
as opposed to well-established rigid categories of thought or classification of reality.
When discussing subjectivity, for example, Gadamer reminds us after Heidegger
that the word 'subject' comes from the Greek hupokeimenon and the Latin .subiectum,
which both mean what lies at the basis. This exercise does not give us a truer concept
of the subject but only allows us to have a feel for the kind of transformation that took
place when Descartes turned the subject from the sense of'what lies at the foundation'
into a 'thinking thing' that thinks itself. By doing what Gadamer recommends, we have
not substituted another concept to the concept of subject and we have not eliminated
the notion of subjectivity. We have only opened up a gap in the obvious character of
subjectivity, which makes us aware of our own position as interpreters and of our own
assumptions. This is the first step for envisaging and imagining other ways of thinking.
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The life in words that. concepts enjoy is precisely what allows them to intervene in
reality, turning reality into a transaction. 'In a concept something is put together
[zusammengegrlffen], combined together [zusammengefasstJ. The word says that the
concept selzes (greifenJ, grabs [zugreifen], and puts together [zusammengreifen) and,
in this way, conceives [begreifi] something. Thinking in concepts is thus an active
thinking that is intrusive [eingreifendj and far-reaching [ausgreifendJ: 21 In another
remarkable conceptual analysis, again following Heidegger, Gadamer explains how ·
ousia, which means landed property, became our philosophical term 'substance'. The
landed property indicates the 'worth' of a farmer and allows the farmer to have a
public persona or a social worth and thus to enjoy presence. To use the term 'landed
property', ousia, about a thing and say that a thing has an ousia is to say, as Plato and
Aristotle did, that, like a farmer can have 'worth' and a social presence through a
landed property, a thing can be individuated as the thing it is, can be present as a
thing, and can dwell through what makes its worth. The abstract sense of 'substance'
follows from there as what constitutes a thing as such and what remains the same
underneath changes. These examples of 'subject' and 'substance' show that it is not
so much the concept that organizes experience, according to common philosophical
sense, as it is experience that gives rise to the concept, although not at the same time.
Concepts are laden with experiences and this sedimentation in the course of time
represents a dimension of history at the heart of our concepts that is our blind spot.
'Concepts are not arbitrary tools of human understanding by which it organizes or
controls experiences. Rather, concepts have always already grown out of experience;
they articulate our understanding of the world and predelineate thereby the· course of
experience. Thus, with any concept through which we think. a pre-decision has already
been made, whose legitimacy we no longer verify: 22
Gadamer obviously does not equate words with concepts. Concepts are indeed
what remain the same, for example, through translations from Greek and English.
They have their own identity in the sense that they can be repeated in their
context. What he points out, however, is that this ideality has a genesis. 'What
philosophical reflection discovers is that there are pre-decisions in concepts that are
so fundamentally hidden that one is somehow entrapped within their interpretive
horizon.'13 It is because of the 'pre-decisions' that have been made in the concepts
we use, pre-decisions we did not make, that we need to remain mindful of the
genesis of such concepts and of the danger of dogmatism in any discipline when
the genesis of concepts is erased. Fo,r such an erasure of genesis is tempting for any
discipline, which can then present its concepts as 'self-evident' or necessary. Such a
gesture, which is all too common in disciplines that present themselves as 'science:
will secure power and authority. Gadamer saw with dismay how the dominance of
the sciences took hold of the whole realm of human affairs by branding as 'non
scientific' or 'inexact science' what did not follow the model of the natural sciences. 2•
By reminding us that our concepts have a genesis, Gadamer reshuffles the power
game in which the conceptual order came to have the upper hand. For, when we are
mindful that our concepts came from somewhere, were born at some time, and were
borne by some predecessors, our blind faith in the sciences and our admiration for
the so-called scienti1ic rigour of their knowledge may appear in a different light: as
an ideologieal bias and a tool to power.
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Gadamer follows Husserl's· fundamentaJ.critique of the formalization of nature,
which started with GaWeo, and borrows Husserl's notion of an 'oblivion of the
subject'. By this Husserl means thal scientists tend to forget that their theories,
models, hypotheses, or experiments were 'designed' by human beings and
originated from a lifeworld. They forget · themselves as investigators. Gadamer,
for his part, characterizes this oblivion of the subject as lhe subject laking itself
out of the equation. 'This is ... the naivety of historical objeclivism: to accepl
such an overlooking of oneself [Absehen von sich selbstl .... Toe naivety of
so-called historicism consists in the fact that ... in I rusting the methodology of
its own procedures it forgets its own historicity [Geschichtlichkeitj.' 25 Against this
-overlooking of oneself as investigator, we can bring out the historicaJ inscription
of any investigation and interpretation, and thus of any 'subject'. This gives us
the opportunity, as philosophers, to trace the path from the concept back lo the
Huid field of human experience. To re-open such a path from concepts back to
experience aJlows us to examine the pre-decisions at the heart of the concept.
Hermeneutics is precisely this investigation that tries to re-awaken the voice of
history in our language and concepts in order to prevent concepts from solidifying
and desiccating, in order, lhus, to keep them alive.
By highlighting the Sprachlichkeit or dimension of language in our intellectual
endeavours, Gadamer wants to protect thinking from falling into the methodology
of a discipline and maintain it as a practice. What makes thinking a practice is
dialogue as what gives traction to thought. Thinking occurs when concepts remain
within the flux of language, understood in their dialogical nature and operating at
the service of existence. This is how dialogue is the engine of history. Dialogue is an
exchange that is a constant unsettling of the subject. Someone starts in the position
of speaker but is always susceptible to be questioned and put in the position of a
listener. To apply the dialogical structure to subjectivity means that the subject is
in the position of someone who is addressed, whose position is subsidiary to the
existence of a dialogue.
There is. however, an important corrective th'at Gadamer stresses in the 'dimension
oflanguage' in order to differentiate it from social constructivism and from Derridean
deconstruction. The historical dimension of concepts is not itself a level of meaning
or a layer of meaning that could be retrieved as such or could be used 10 relalivize
the concepts we use or the content of what someone says. It is not the basis for a
generalized genetic fallacy, holding that what we say is relative to who we are, where
we live, what culture or religion we belong to. Such a view would simply and naivelr
postulate another layer of concepts behind the concepts we use. The historical
dimension, for Gadamer, cannot be reified in such a way as a super-subject. Thus,
history is not a voice speaking through us, but only a resource that allows us to make
fluid again the path from words to concepts. The dimension of language is also no! a
reduction of the subject to a play of differences that would eliminate the very notion
of subjectivity as a mere effect of language, as Derrida sees the subject as a 'function
of language:26 Rather, treading the path again between experience and concepts aims
at making our concepts leM rigid than they tend to become and allows us to find a
small gap in them, a dehiscence through which questions can be raised so that we may
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question our own concepts and !)1ake them dialogical again, disclosing the linguistic
flesh out of which they are made. To emphasize the dimension of language and to
consider both subject and object of investigation in their event-character does not
amount to replacing the subject by a super-subject of historical or societal forces nor
trivializing it as a mere effect. It only aims at making both subject and object more
complex than well-delineated entities.
Let us DOW turn to another form of 'thinking of the event': Foucault's views on
speech as drama.

Foucault: The drama of speech
As he explains io his last lectures at the Coll~ge de France on what he, remarkably,
calls a 'hermeneutics of the subject', Foucault revisits his former works and claims
that his focus had been all along on the 'experiences' of subjects. In The Order of
Things and Archaeology of Knowledge the focus was on discursive objects but, he says
retrospectively, in the sense of the kinds of experiences that made the particular kinds
of discourse possible in the Renaissance, the Classical Age, or the nineteenth century.
In his investigations of madness or the prison the focus was also, he retrospectively
claims, on the kinds of experiences that were associated with madness or criminality
as well as the kinds of experiences the institutions of the psychiatric hospitals or the
prison system made possible for those in the institution and outside. Finally, in his last
lectures the focus was on the experiences of subjectivity or the practices through which
subjects form themselves.
This focus on experience situates the objects of his investigation - whether analysis
of wealth, life, language, or madness, prison, sexuality or, last, subjectivity - in
their own specific historical context. This was clearly stated in Ih.e Order of Things
and Archaeology of Knowledge. Th.e different discourses or utterances that Foucault
examined were treated as made of 'statements' and understood as 'events'. But in the
course of his development Foucault came to realize more and more that his own
approach consisted in 'turning into events' what he investigated. He saw this as a
'procedure of analysis' and created the word evenementialiser, 'to turn Into event', 27
to name this kind of analysis. In addition, besides using the notion of 'event' to name
the object of his investigation and the approach he chose for investigating such an
object, he also theorizes his own work as a 'pragmatics'. His own wor~, he says, are
also 'events', for which he uses the term 'dramaturgy'. 28 They set something on stage and
'dramatize' what he investigates.
We thus have three levels at which we can apply the term 'event': methodologically
It is how Foucault treats the documents he examines - as events or, as he says, as
'monuments', instead of 'documents'. Second, this kind of analysis is a way of slowing
down the continuity and progress of history in order to detect the 'events' that have
ruptured it. As a result, this analysis 'produces events: 'turns into an event: or 'eventifies'
what It ~nalyses. Third, this means that, wh~n looking at Foucault's own works, we
can see their pragmatic nature as setting up the drama in which w'hat these works
Investigate unfolded. Let us examine each of these three levels of 'event'.
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The object of investigation as an event
In The Order of Things and Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault uses the notion of
event to characterize the specific difference of a 'statement' compared to a sentence, a
proposition, or a performative.
We must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine
its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other
statements that may be connected with it. and show what other forms of statement
it excludes . . . . The question proper to such an analysis might be formulated
in this way: what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and
·
nowhere else?lll
Giving as an example the sentence 'Dreams fulfill desires', which has been used by Plato
and Freud, among others, he argues that, although we have the same sentence (once
translated) and the same proposition, which made the translation possible, we have
two different statements because we have two different events.:t-0
In The Archaeology of Knowledge he uses four parameters to identify a statement:
(1) a referential, (2) a subject, (3) an associated field, and (4) material conditions. The
starting point is not a 'referent', which is assumed to exist in a self-evident status as
universal and, as such, susceptible to be 'referred to'. Rather, Foucault chooses to start
with discourses. He wants to examine what these discourses produce, what he calls
their 'referential'. Different from a referent, a referential is a range of objects or a kind
of object that a particular discourse forms and brings into existence. Even if Plato and
Freud may have the same referent when speaking_about dreams, the referential of their
statement is different: Plato's interest in the psyche and passions, on the one hand, and
Freud's interest in drives and the unconscious, on the other. What Foucault wants to
emphasize is that, by describing what has been said as an event, we offer an additional
layer of description to what the history of ideas or the history of a discipline can do.
Once we focus on the event of the arising of sentences and discourses in time, the
referent of those sentences loses its stable and self-evident aspect and comes to be seen
as the object produced by those sentences.
A statement is not confronted (face to face, as it were) by a correlate - or the absence
of a correlate - as a proposition has (or has not) a referent, or as a proper noun
designates someone (or no one). It is linked rather to a 'referential' [referentiel]
that is made up not of'things: 'facts: 'realities: or <beings', but oflaws of possibility,
rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within
it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it 11
This also means, then, that the subjects Plato and Freud, besides being seen as
constituting subjects and authors of their own thoughts, can be envisaged within
the event as placeholders, as those who have been made possible by a certain set
of circumstances and a certain kind of discourse to utter the sentences they did
and be understood as meaningful and relevant. This is the second parameter of
a statement. The subject of the statement is not 'identical with the author of the
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formulation'. For the author is c~nsidered to be 'the cause, origin, or starting-point
of the phenomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a sentence' or the
'meaningful intention which, silently anticipating words, orders them like the
visible bo.dy of its intuition'. By contrast, the subject of a statement is a placeholder,
'a particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individuals'. For
the kind of investigation that Foucault conducts, this means that the issue is no
longer to find out what was meant but rather to determine 'what position
and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it'.32 The
subject of a statement is thus neither a psychological subject, as of a sentence,
nor a transcendental subject of propositions guaranteeing their validity. Instead
of being seen as the origin and guarantee of a statement the subject has in fact
been prepared, has been granted its status and given voice by a certain discursive
practice, of Greek thinking (Plato) or nineteenth-/twentieth-century European
scientific clinical discourse (Freud).
The third parameter is an associated field. A statement does not stand in .isolation
but is part of a set of other statements that are linked to practices. For example, the
notion of'homicidal monomania' that appeared at the end of the nineteenth century
could be talked about because there was a new fi'.tld or a new discourse: psychiatry.
What Foucault claims is that the proposition including the phrase 'homicidal
monomania' is dated in its birth. The consequence is that, when seen in its historical
situation - as a statement - it also loses its validity across time and, in this case, has
indeed lost it; we no longer use th.is notion. The statement has a repeatability that is
limited by the field with which it is associated and cannot be repeated outside such
a field. Foucault can then claim that the statements that he identifies in the Classical
Age are not only different from statements made in the nineteenth century. but
that they could not have been made in the nineteenth century. 'One cannot speak
of anything at any time.'H The fourth parameter is about material conditions. The
materiality of the statement consists not only in the words said and recorded but also
In the conditions that obtain at the time of the utterance, social, economic, political.
It is precisely because of these material conditions that the term 'archaeology' can
be used meaningfully. Although it is not a task of digging anything material, it is a
task of uncovering conditions of possibility that lie behind the statement so that the
event of its production can be isolated, identified, and described.
The advantage of treating statements as events is that both the thing and the word
are 'bracketed' and the trap of the reference is avoided: we are not dealing with a word
referring to a thing or a concept having an e_xtension, regardless of time and history.
As Foucault says, 'From the kind of analysis I have undertaken, words are deliberately
absent as are things. 'J< Or more forcefuJly:

can

What, in short, we wish to do is to dispense with 'things. To 'depresentify' them
(dt-pre.sentifier) •..• To substitute for the enigmatic 'treasure' of things anterior to
discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only i_n discou.r~e. 'lb define
these objects without reference to their ground in things (sans rtftrence au fo11d des
chosrs] , bur by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects
o( a discourse and thus conslitute the conditions of their historical appearance. J~
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lhe analysis of statements, then,. is a historical analysis, but one that avoids all
interpretation: 'It does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they
were "really" saying, in spite of them~lves, the unspoken element that they contain ...
but, on the contrary, it questions them as to their mode of existence ... what it means
for them to have appeared when ano where they did - they and no others: 36 In our
example above. Plato could not mean what Freud meant and vice versa.
This focus on statements instead of sentences or propositions allows Foucault to
speak of a 'historical a priori', which he borrows with a significant transformation from
the Husserl of the Crisis. This paradoxical formulation aims at identifying a condition
of possibility for discourse, but one that is not formal. It is not 'a condition of validity for
Judgments' but 'a condition of reality for statements'. 37 By this he means 'the conditions
of emergence of statements, the laws of their coexistence with others, the specific
form of their mode of being, the principles according to which they survive, become
transformed, and disappear'.l8 When investigating these conditions of emergence,
we in fact investigate the 'archive' of a certain discursive era, and this investigation is
properly called an 'archaeology of knowledge'. The 'archive' is supposed to name 'that
which, at the very root of the statement-event, and in that which embodies it, defines
at the outset the system of its enunclability .... It is that which defines the mode of
occurrence of the statement-thing; it is the system of its functioning:3 9
The methodologicai difficulty pointed out by critics is that this archaeology as an
analysis does not account for the ground on which it stands. Even worse, it cannot
apply its method to the present. Regarding the latter point, Foucault wholeheartedly
acknowledges it. 'It is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from
within these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say - and to
itself, the object of our discourse - its modes of appearance, its forms of existence and
coexistence, its system of accumulation, historicity, and disappearance:40 Regarding
the former point - the position from where he speaks - Foucault's position has shifted
quite significantly. At the time of The Archt1eology of Knowledge he responded that it
was not his task to determine the standpoint from which he speaks. This is a task for his
interpreters and critics. 'For the moment, and as far ahead as I can see, my discourse,
far from determining the locus in which it speaks, is avoiding the ground on which it
could find support .... Its task is to make differences: to constitute them as objects, to
analyse them, and to define their concept.'41 He simply claimed for his own discoveries
a certain positivity that can serve as a 'diagnosis'.42 As a correlate of this diagnosis he
also accepts the fact that his own discourse is not anchored, but remains free-floating,
even with regard to its relevance. 'I accept that my discourse may disappear with the
figure that has borne it so far.'J
Later on, he came to theorize his own situation and specify the kind of diagnosis
he was doing. He did this in two steps: in presenting his analysis as a way of treating
objects as 'events' - this is the second sense in which he uses the notion of event - and
in arguing that his own works are a 'pragmatics', dramatizing some phenomena and
thereby contributlng to 'the history of the present: This is the third sense in which he
uses the notion of event. Let us examine the second sense of'event' that Foucault uses,
which is part of a method to turn the objects of his investigation into events, what he
calls evenementialisaHon.
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Analysis as a 'Production_of Events' (evenementialisation)
Foucault characterizes his overaU enterprise as an effort 'to treat the instances of
discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events'. 44 The
word evb1ementiallsatio11~ that he creates to name this process is easily understandable
as 'making of something an event', 'turning into an event: 'eventifying'. He calls this
a 'procedure of analysis'. It is thus a methodological principle consisting in injecting
ruptures in what may appear as the continuity and linearity of historical development.
'I consider history as a succession of fragments, a succession of chance occurrences
(hasards I, of violences, of ruptures:~ This strategy of ruptures has different components.
I see four. First, it consists in 'causing a singularity to irrupt: to show that it was not
necessary after all, it was not so self-evident after all that mad people were recognized
as mental patients; it was not so self-evident after all that the only thing to do with
delinquents was to incarcerate them'. 47 Instead of having a linear causal explanation,
we can now see many connections, what Foucault calls a 'multiplication of finer causes'
(demultiplication causale). For example, the practice of incarceration as an event can be
analysed through the process of penalization, of internment, of imprisonment proper
to criminal justice. 43
Second, and negatively, the strategy of rupture undermines our position in time
as a reference point from which we can look back at history as what preceded us
and prepared us. The shortcoming of such a view is that past epochs are viewed as
preparing us through what look like tentative and misguided preparatory steps. This
is often how disciplines tend to see their prehistory: they have evolved by discarding
previous views and theories as pseudosciences, and are progressing towards a telos
of better scientificity. In addition, the privilege of hindsight confines the past to be
a variation of what we know so that the past is rendered tamed and innocuous, as
what can be safely discarded for a better present. Third, and positively, the strategy of
ruptures unmasks our own contingency by taking away any self-evidence our science,
theories, and unassailable concepts - truth, madness, subject of rights - may have.
This takes the form of neutralizing 'referents' or what Foucault calls a 'rupture of self
evidence' against a 'historical constant' or 'anthropological universals'.' 9 In Foucault's
methodology it meant 'to reject ''madness", "deliquency'' or "sexuality" as universals'.><'
Fourth, the strategy of evenementialisation also aims at bracketing the subject as author
of statements or discourses so that the works Foucault investigates are manifestations
of practice.s within which a subject is constituted. Thus, the evenementialisation shifts
the focus away from what subjects represent in their mind towards practices: what
people do, for example, what did people do with the mad, the delinquents, or the sick.5 i
'What matters is to take as a homogeneous domain of reference not the representations
that human beings ha.ve of themselves, not the conditions that determine them without
them knowing It, but what they do and the manner in which they do it: 52
This method of analysis by turning objects of investigation into events is not
historicism, but, Foucault argues, the opposite. Historicism presupposes a universal
whereas his 'problem' is, he says, 'totally the opposite. My starting point is the decision,
which is both theoretical and methodological, that says: let us suppose that universals
do not exist, and then I ask history and historians: how can you write history if you
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do not accept a priori that something like the state, society, the sovereign power, the
subjects exist?' 53 There is a third sense in which Foucault uses the notion of 'event:
besides the characterization of the ~bject of investigation and his method of analysis.

Philosophy as a dramaturgy of events
Because he rejects hermeneutics, which, he claims, tries to recover _another speech
hidden behind the text investigated, he also rejects - without mentioning it - any
'fusion of horizons' between the object to be interpreted and the interpreter, which
is how Gadamer understands the 'hermeneutic experience'. What Foucault gives us ·the result of his analysis - is, be says, itself part of an event, what he calls 'an event
in thought' [un Mnement d4ns la pensee]. At the beginning of his lectures on the
Hermeneutics of the Subject, examining the care of the self in antiquity, he writes:
What I would like to show you, what I would like to speak about this year, is this
history that made this general cultural phenomenon (this exhortation, this general
acceptance of the principle that one should take care of oneself) both a general
cultural phenomenon peculiar to Hellenistic and Roman society (anyway, to its
elite), and at the same time an event in thought [un evenement tkns la pe,m!e]. 54
This notion of an 'event in thought' comes from Heidegger's 'history of the present's~
and, before him, from Nietzsche who. in his Untimely Considerations, talks about the
use of history for the present. Foucault recognized that his genealogy is Nietzschean
in its inspiration and design. He appropriates Nietzsche's view of history as being for
the sake of the present and understands this standpoint as a recognition of one's own
contingency when speaking and thinking. Instead of being a critique or a critical
investigation, the question Foucault asks is rather, in reference to Kant's question
about the Enlightenment, 'What is our presenH [actualite)? What is the present field
of possible experiences?'56 Foucault calls it 'an ,ontology of the present, an ontology
of ourselves'.57
In this third sense of event, Foucault can now respond more convincingly to
his readers who wondered from the beginning about Foucault's own situation and
standpoint. ln The Archaeology, as we saw, he said tliat it was not his question or
problem. But in his last lectures he accepts to answer this question by characterizing
his own discourse in L'usage des plaisirs as a 'pragmatics'. His studies are, he says, a
'philosophical exercise' whose stakes are 'to learn to what extent the effort to think
one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think
differently. 51 Let us ponder this a bit. He already said in 1he Archaeology that his works
are a 'diagnosis'. Now he makes this characterization more specific: it is a diagnosis of
our present and he performs this diagnosis as a 'pragmatics'. He writes,
I am not interested in the eternal, I am not interested in what does not change, I
am not interested in what remains stable under the shimmering of appearances.
I am interested in the event .... It is here again Nietzsche who was the first, 1
think, to define philosophy as the activity that helps us know what is going on and
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what is going on now. ln oth~r words, we are permeated by processes, movements,
forces. We do not know those processes and forces and the role of the philosopher
is probably to be the diagnostician of those forces, of diagnosing the present
time .!lactualite]. 5'

As a diagnosis of the present Foucault directly links the object of investigation to the
investigator or, more accurately, the event of some discursive practices to the event 'of
the analysis. By taking into consideration the position of the speaker - for example,
Foucault's position - when analysing a phenomenon, Foucault performatively, as it
were, shows what is involved in any investigation. We mentioned Husserl's concern
about an 'oblivion of the subject' and Gadamer's analogous concern of taking ourselves
outside of the picture. Foucault explains his 'remedy' to this oblivion (to use Nietzsche's
terms of a 'remedy' to the 'poison' of history).
In my books I try to grasp an event that seemed to me, that seems to me important
for our present times [actualitel while being an event of the past. For example
about madness, it seems to .me that, at one point, there was in the Western world
a separation between madness and non-madness. At another moment in time,
there was a certain manner of grasping the intensity of the crime and the human
problem caused by the crime. It seems to me that we repeat all those events.
We repeat those events in our present time and I try to grasp what the event is
under the sign of which we were born and what the event is that continues to
permeate us. 60
This remedy to the oblivion of the subject goes farther than a fusion of horizons.
Foucault connects the truth of what is said with the historical situation of utterance
or emergence, as we saw in his first two senses of event, and, now he adds a third
term: the ethos of the speaker or investigator. This is how his 'pragmatics' works, by
acknowledging in the investigatfon the three forces of a/etheia, politeia, and ethos. This
means, remarkably, that Foucault as an author is also part and parcel of what he is
doing and saying. As was the case for the 'statement' in The Archaeology, the subject of
discourse is a placeholder that is made possible by rules of discourse in a specific set of
material conditions. This applies to Foucault as a subject as well.
My book is a fiction, pure aod simple: it is a novel, but I am not the one who
invented it. It is the relationship of our present time and its epistemologi<;al
configuration to all this mass of statements. As a result, the subject [Foucault] is
indeed present in the totality of the book, but it is the anonymous 'one' who speaks
today in all that is said. 61
However, he further grants an efficacy to this pragmatics so that it is not just a pragmatic

way of analysing, but the analysis itself has pragmatic effects in the world. His analyses,
he says, 'will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the
po11Sibllity ofno longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think'.fil Let us see
how this pragmatics functions.
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His books, he says, are part of a 'dramaturgy': they stage dramas. We saw that in
fragmenting history he turned some discourses into events. Now he presents these
events as a 'drama' of thought. It is .a drama because what he does is a 'dramatization of
events' 63 or an 'intensification' of phenomena. It is not that his works re-enact the drama
of people in the past cau·g ht in the discourses and practices of medicine or psychiatry,
but rather that his works dramatize some events - the arising of natural history or the
emergence of the discourse of psychiatry. By so doing, he intensifies the objects he
investigates in the sense of making them salient, branding them as noticeable, taking
them out of the tranquU continuity of a discipline. The efficacy of his works is thus in
turn 'eventful: He writes, 'I would like to write bomb books [des liVTes bombes], that is
· to say, books that would be useful precisely at the moment when someone writes them
or reads them. Afterward, they would disappear .... Books should be kinds of bombs
and nothing else.'64
The efficacy of his works consists in a liberation of the objects and the subjects. In
the case of objects, when seen within such a pragmatics, as staged and dramatized,
they are protected from being assessed and judged according to present standards
given present interests. ln the case of subjects, once we acknowledge that the event
as a singularity cannot be separated from the thinking of the event, and thus that our
own thinking has an 'event-character: we have a chance to think as ifwe were outside
our present or, rather, as if we saw our present from another, for example, Greek.
perspective. We see our present within history and this gives us, as already quoted, 'the
possibUity of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think'. 65
This has significant consequences for what we call the 'truth: While in
phenomenology the fact that consciousness is always 'consciousness of' already forced
some rearrangement of epistemology and ontology, Foucault goes much farther. The
truth is in fact produced so that the analysis has to attend to this process of 'making
true: which is historically situated. If the truth is of statements, which are themselves
events, and if these events are themselves 'produced' by a certain methodological
attitude that turns its objects into events, the truth has an ontological link to history.
Truth itself is of the order of the event.
··
Truth does not belong to the order of what is, but of what happens, of the event.
Truth is not discovered [constatee] but elicited lswcitee): production instead
of apophantics. Truth is not given through the mediation of instruments. It is
provoked by rituals: it is drawn by ruses, it is caught on occasions: strategy and
not method. Of this event thus produced upon the individual who is lying in wait
for it and who is struck by it, the relationship is not of the object to the subject
of knowledge. It is an ambiguous relationship, reversible, bellicose of mastery, of
domination, of victory: it is a relationship of power.""
In short, to the dramaturgy of the analysis there corresponds an 'alethurgy' on the
side of the statements. 'Alethurgy would be etymologically the production of truth,
the act through which truth manifests itselC 67 Linked to the disappearance of rigid
referents characterized by universality, truth is, before being a property of judgements
and propositions, what 'emerges' from practices. For example, the truth of 'homicidal
monomania' emerged from within the new discipline of psychiatry and has since then
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disappeared. History, Foucault. says, is 'the history of the emergence of the games
of truth Ueux de veriti). It is the history of "veridiction" understood as the forms
according to which the discourses that are susceptible to be true or false find their
articulation on a domain of things: 611
'Veridiction' is the name that Foucault gives to truth in its practice or to truth in
the event of its emergence. Veridiction is linked to an 'atethurgy'. Before what is sajd
can be assessed as true - the dictum as verum - there needs to be a trne saying· a dicere that is verum. 69 When we attend to the event of truth and focus on the
production of truth or alethurgy, the goal is to convey on any phenomenon under
investigation its meaning, but one that is of a specific kind: it is a meaning that is,
Foucault tells us, 'variable, historical, and never universal'.'0 This is due to tbe focus
on the singularity of what is investigated and the recognition of the singularity of
the investigation itself. We thus have a hermeneutics of singularity within a thinking
of the present. In other words, we attend to what is historically unique - it is thus
'historical' - but viewe.d from our present - it is thus 'variable'. The combination of
the singularity of the subject with the singularity of the object can dispense with
universality - it is thus 'never universal' - because this is not what the analysis aims
at bringing to the fore.
The modality of the truth-telling proper to the thinking of the event will be 'polemic:
as Foucault says in Le courage de la verite. It is polemic because the meaning to l>e
given to a phenomenon will locate this phenomenon in its unique historical place and
such a meaning, of necessity, will be 'variable'. However, 'variable' and 'never universal'
are not to be understood negatively, but positively as what we see as 'unique' in the
past from our perspective that is also seen as contingent 'Polemic' is thus also to be
understood positively as what questions existing descriptions of phenomena by adding
new descriptions of these phenomena. We multiply the descriptions, but do not create
competing accounts of the 'same' phenomena. We rather carve out things and facts in
different 'discursive objects' or as different matrix.es of experience.
The polemic aspect that is at the heart of Foucault's views on interpretation could
not be more at odds with Gadamer's whole enterprise of hermeneutics as centred
on reaching, an understanding. Gadamer too wants to do justice to the singularity
of the object of investigation. However, he maintains a claim to universality for the
hermeneutic experience itself. The truth is reached in a dialogue. In addition, no
matter how different interpretations may be, the fusion of horizons guarantees a
compatibility even among radically different interpretations. Dissent ls thus always
local, for Gadamer, confined to the broad mutual understanding of the existing
dialogue. We can certainly disagree in a dialogue and may well engage in a polemic,
but the very existence of dialogue prevents the polemic from undermining the
possibility of reaching an understanding. Even when he has to acknowledge tbat his
dialogues with Derrida could not get traction, Gadamer continues to see this as an
accidental problem, not as a fundamental issue. 71 His fusion of horizons is the bearer
of hermeneutic optimism, free from drama.
Yet despite their multiple differences, what both Gadamer and Foucault offer are
not merely two options on the same phenomenon of speech or interpretation, but
rather two alternate accounts of how interpretation works. The originality of their
approaches is, first, to explain how interpretation and the object of interpretation
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are intrinsically linked by focusing on the role of language in both the interpretation
process and the formation of the object. It is, second, to articulate the place of the
interpreter within the process of.interpretation, thereby proposing a notion of truth
that is a historical process and a transformation of the subjects. For both, the truth is
not only about the interpretation itself, but more originally and fundamentally about
how the interpretation can transform the interpreter.
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